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JURISDICTION 
 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2).   
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1:  Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment in favor 
of Picture Perfect Stone Masonry, LLC pursuant to the statute of repose set forth 
in Utah Code § 78B-2-225(3)(a) applicable to real property improvements, where 
the statute of repose bars contract and warranty claims that are not “commenced 
within six years of” “the date of first use or possession of the improvement,” and 
where it is undisputed that the subject property was used or possessed more than 
six years before Douglas Knight Construction, Inc. filed its claims against Picture 
Perfect?  
 Preservation:  Picture Perfect preserved this argument in its memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment (R. 4045-4086) and in the hearing 
held regarding its motion (R. 5244). 
 Standard of Review:  A district court’s grant of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness and without deference to the district court’s 
decision.  Olsen v. Fair Co., 2016 UT App 46, ¶ 6, --- P.3d. ---.  
ISSUE 2:  Did Douglas Knight fail to preserve the argument that its 
“indemnity and contribution” claim against Picture Perfect is not “based in contract 
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or warranty” and therefore not subject to the six-year statute of repose set forth 
in Utah Code § 78B-2-225(3)(a)?   
 Preservation:  This issue was not addressed below because Douglas Knight 
raised it for the first time on appeal.   
 Standard of Review:  “To properly preserve an issue for appellate review, 
the issue must be raised in the district court. Additionally, the issue must be 
specifically raised, in a timely manner, and must be supported by evidence and 
relevant legal authority.”  Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ¶ 20, 266 P.3d 839. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
78B-2-225.  Actions related to improvements in real property.  
 
(1) As used in this section:  
(a) “Abandonment” means that there has been no design or construction 
activity on the improvement for a continuous period of one year. 
(b) “Action” means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for 
acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty arising out of or related to the 
design, construction, or installation of an improvement, whether based in 
tort, contract, warranty, strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or other 
source of law. 
(c) “Completion of improvement” means the date of substantial completion of 
an improvement to real property as established by the earliest of:  
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion; 
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; or 
(iii) the date of first use or possession of the improvement. 
 
(d) “Improvement” means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, 
or other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to 
real property. 
(e) “Person” means an individual, corporation, limited liability company, 
3 
partnership, joint venture, association, proprietorship, or any other legal or 
governmental entity. 
(f) “Provider” means any person contributing to, providing, or performing 
studies, plans, specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or 
quantity estimates, surveys, staking, construction, and the review, 
observation, administration, management, supervision, inspections, and 
tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement. 
 
(2) The Legislature finds that:  
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or 
breach of duty after the possibility of injury or damage has become highly 
remote and unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to the provider and 
the citizens of the state; 
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage 
costs, undue and unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider 
and an improvement, and difficulties in defending against claims many 
years after completion of an improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and 
unexpected seven years following completion or abandonment; and 
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the citizens 
of the state to impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in this 
chapter upon all causes of action by or against a provider arising out of or 
related to the design, construction, or installation of an improvement. 
 
(3) (a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be 
commenced within six years of the date of completion of the improvement 
or abandonment of construction. Where an express contract or warranty 
establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated 
within that limitations period. 
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two 
years from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the 
date upon which a cause of action should have been discovered through 
reasonable diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable 
before completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the 
two-year period begins to run upon completion or abandonment. 
 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an action may not be commenced against a 
provider more than nine years after completion of the improvement or 
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abandonment of construction. In the event the cause of action is discovered or 
discoverable in the eighth or ninth year of the nine-year period, the injured 
person shall have two additional years from that date to commence an action. 
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an action against a provider:  
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or breach of duty, 
or the injury, damage, or other loss caused by his act, error, omission, or 
breach of duty; or 
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty. 
 
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action 
within the periods prescribed by Subsections (3) and (4) solely because that 
person was a minor or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, that 
person shall have two years from the date the disability is removed to 
commence the action. 
(7) This section shall not apply to an action for the death of or bodily injury to an 
individual while engaged in the design, installation, or construction of an 
improvement. 
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section does not apply to any action against 
any person in actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, 
or otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe condition of the improvement 
proximately causes the injury for which the action is brought. 
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise 
prescribed by law or a valid and enforceable contract. 
(10) This section does not create or modify any claim or cause of action. 
(11) This section applies to all causes of action that accrue after May 3, 2003, 
notwithstanding that the improvement was completed or abandoned before 
May 3, 2004. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, 
and disposition in the court below 
 
 This is a construction defect case relating to a single-family residential 
premises located in Park City, Utah (“Premises”).  (R. 1-31).  Pursuant to a 
construction contract dated July 21, 2004, Appellant Douglas Knight Construction, 
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Inc. (“Douglas Knight”) acted as the general contractor of the Premises.  (R. 
817; 894-903).  Construction commenced shortly after Summit County issued a 
building permit for construction of the Premises on August 5, 2004.   
In connection with its construction efforts, Douglas Knight hired Picture 
Perfect Stone Masonry, LLC (“Picture Perfect”) to act as a masonry subcontractor 
on the project.  (R. 4059-4060).  After Picture Perfect and the other subcontractors 
finished their work, the home passed final inspection and the Summit County 
Building Inspector issued a final inspection report on February 24, 2006.  (R. 
4056). 
Outpost Development, Inc. acted as the developer for the construction 
project.  (R. 817 ¶¶ 8-9; 3205-3214).  After construction was complete and the 
final inspection certificate was issued, between February 24, 2006 and March 17, 
2006, Outpost “staged” the Premises for sale.  (R. 4056; 3011-3013; 4062-4064).   
In so doing, Outpost placed furniture and other household items throughout the 
house to make it look pleasant to prospective buyers who visited the Premises.  Id. 
 The Tomlinsons (not a party to the dispute between Douglas Knight and 
Picture Perfect) toured the Premises shortly before extending their March 17, 2006 
offer.  (R. 3239-41; 3369; 4062-63).  The Tomlinsons had no interaction with 
Douglas Knight, as it was a “spec house.” Id. When they toured the Premises, the 
local authority had already issued the certificate of final inspection on the 
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Premises.  (R. 3368; 4056).   Mrs. Tomlinson testified that when she first saw the 
home, it was decorated beautifully and the state of construction was “totally 
finished.”  (R. 3011-3013; 4062-4064).   
Shortly after they first visited the Premises, on March 17, 2006 the 
Tomlinsons offered to purchase the Premises.  (R. 3205-3214; 4066-4075).  
Outpost accepted the Tomlinsons’ offer and the sale was finalized.   
The Tomlinsons subsequently filed their lawsuit against Douglas Knight on 
July 30, 2010, alleging that Douglas Knight was liable for claimed defects in 
workmanship and construction of the Premises.  (R. 1-31).  After a period of 
discovery, on April 30, 2012 Douglas Knight filed a third-party complaint against 
Picture Perfect and other subcontractors alleging contract, warranty, and 
“indemnity and contribution” claims.  R. 879-890.   
 After discovery was completed, Picture Perfect filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  (R. 4042-4044; 4045-4089).  Picture Perfect’s motion argued that it was 
undisputed that the Premises had been “used” or “possessed” when Outpost, the 
Tomlinsons’ predecessor interest, staged the home for sale by decorating it with 
furniture and other household items.  (R. 4048-4049).  Based upon such, Picture 
Perfect argued that Douglas Knight’s claims against it were barred under the six-
year statute of repose in Section 78B-2-225.  (Id.). 
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The district court agreed, concluding that because the Premises was used or 
possessed no later than March 17, 2006, construction was substantially completed 
when the Tomlinsons extended their sale offer on that date.  (R. 5255-5258; 4037-
4041).  (The district court also noted that it had reached the same conclusion in a 
prior similar motion filed by another third-party defendant, Superior Insulation 
Co., Inc.  See id.; see also, Add. Exh. A).  Because Douglas Knight’s claims 
against Picture Perfect were filed more than 6 years after March 17, 2006, the 
district court found that Douglas Knight’s claims were barred by the statute of 
repose in Section 78B-2-225.1  Id. 
Douglas Knight timely appealed the district court’s summary judgment 
ruling.  (R. 6226-6241).   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Where construction defect claims are based on contract or warranty, Utah 
law requires that the claims “be commenced within six years of the date of 
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction.”  Utah Code § 
                                                          
1 Although the district court also denied Picture Perfect’s motion for summary 
judgment in part, that denial is not at issue in the case.  The district court permitted 
Douglas Knight’s claims against Picture Perfect to go forward as to a single visit 
Picture Perfect made to the Premises after March 17, 2006, on May 22, 2006.  (R. 
5258).  Douglas Knight later stipulated to dismissal without prejudice of its 
remaining claims against Picture Perfect to the extent those claims were predicated 
upon Picture Perfect’s one visit to the Premises that occurred after March 17, 2006.  
(R. 6319-6323).   
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78B-2-225(3)(a).  “Completion of the improvement” means “the date of substantial 
completion of an improvement to real property as established by the earliest of: (i) 
a Certificate of Substantial Completion; (ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a 
governing agency; or (iii) the date of first use or possession of the improvement.”  
Id. at 78B-2-225(1)(c). 
Douglas Knight’s breach of contract, breach of warranty, and “indemnity 
and contribution” claims against Picture Perfect were untimely because Douglas 
Knight filed its claims more than six years after construction of the Premises was 
complete.  The undisputed evidence shows that before March 17, 2006, Outpost 
had taken control of the Premises from the general contractor Douglas Knight; the 
Premises had passed final inspection by the local authority; Outpost had nicely 
decorated and staged the house with furniture and household items; Outpost had 
listed the Premises for sale; and, Outpost was actively marketing the Premises to 
potential buyers such as the Tomlinsons.   
Based upon those undisputed facts, for purposes of applying Section 78B-2-
225(3)(a), construction was complete no later than March 17, 2006 because the 
Tomlinsons’ predecessor Outpost “first use[d] or possess[ed]” the Premises before 
that date.  See id. at 78B-2-225(1)(c).  Douglas Knight did not file its claims until 
April 30, 2012, which was more than 6 years after March 17, 2006, “the date of 
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first use or possession of the improvement.”  Section 78B-2-225(1)(c).  Therefore, 
Douglas Knight’s claims are time barred under Section 78B-2-225(3)(a). 
Finally, Douglas Knight did not preserve its argument that its “indemnity 
and contribution” claim should be treated separately from its contract and warranty 
claims and that it is not subject to the six-year statute of repose.   Based upon the 
lack of preservation, the Court should refuse to entertain that argument.    
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
STATUTE OF REPOSE IN SECTION 78B-2-225(3)(a) BARRED 
DOUGLAS KNIGHT’S CLAIMS AGAINST PICTURE PERFECT. 
 
 The district court granted summary judgment to Picture Perfect, concluding 
that the six-year statute of repose in Section 78B-2-225(3)(a) rendered Douglas 
Knight’s claims untimely.  This Court should affirm the district court’s conclusion.  
Douglas Knight admits that Outpost had possession of the home and extensively 
decorated and staged the home for sale between February 24, 2006 and March 17, 
2006.  This fact disposes of Douglas Knight’s claims against Picture Perfect. 
a. Douglas Knight’s claims are untimely under Section 78B-2-
225(3)(a) because Outpost first used or possessed the Premises 
more than 6 years before Douglas Knight filed suit against Picture 
Perfect. 
 
Section 78B-2-225(3)(a) provides, “An action by or against a provider based 
in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of 
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completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction.”2  The statute in 
turn defines “completion of the improvement” as “the date of substantial 
completion of an improvement to real property as established by the earliest of: (i) 
a Certificate of Substantial Completion; (ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a 
governing agency; or (iii) the date of first use or possession of the 
improvement.”  Section 78B-2-225(1)(c).   
This Court has interpreted Section 78B-2-225(3)(a) to set forth a statute of 
repose, not a statute of limitation.  Willis v. DeWitt, 2015 UT App 123, ¶¶ 8-11, 
350 P.3d 250.   As a statute of repose, Section 78B-2-225(3)(a) is not subject to 
tolling based upon any of the “usual reasons for tolling” that might apply to a 
statute of limitation.  Id. at ¶ 8.   
At issue here is the meaning of the third basis for a finding of “completion” 
of a real property improvement, i.e., “first use or possession of the 
improvement.”3  Section 78B-2-225(3)(a)(iii); (1)(c).  The undisputed evidence 
shows “the date of first use or possession of the improvement” was no later than 
March 17, 2006, because before that date, general contractor Douglas Knight had 
transferred possession of the Premises to the owner-developer Outpost, Outpost 
                                                          
2 Because it is undisputed that Picture Perfect is a “provider” under Section 78B-2-
225(3)(a) and that the Premises is an “improvement,” the meanings of those terms 
are not discussed herein. 
 
3 The other two elements of subsection (1)(c) are not at issue.    
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had staged, decorated and furnished the home for sale, Outpost was actively 
marketing the home and showing the home to prospective buyers, and Outpost had 
received an offer to purchase the home.  Accordingly, by that date, the Premises 
was “complete” for purposes of triggering the countdown of the statute of repose.  
See 78B-2-225(1)(C)(iii);(3)(a).   
The analysis is straightforward.  Douglas Knight filed its third-party 
complaint against Picture Perfect on April 30, 2012, which is more than six years 
after March 17, 2006, when it is undisputed that Outpost was using or possessing 
the Premises.  The district court’s ruling was correct and should be affirmed.   
b. Because the relevant facts are undisputed, the district court 
appropriately entered summary judgment. 
 
Douglas Knight argues that the district court’s summary judgment ruling 
should be reversed because, says Douglas Knight, the facts pertinent to the 
question of when the Premises “was complete enough to be used for its intended 
purpose as a residence” are disputed.”  Brief of Douglas Knight at p. 32.    
Initially, the question of “intended” use is not relevant because that is not a 
factor identified in the statute in question.  See generally Section 78B-2-225.   
More importantly, Douglas Knight’s argument boils down to a disagreement 
with the district court’s conclusion regarding the legal import of the undisputed 
facts that Outpost staged and decorated the house and marketed it for sale; that 
Outpost actually did those things with the Premises is nonetheless undisputed.  
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In its opposition to summary judgment, Douglas Knight admitted that 
Outpost had decorated and staged the home between February 24, 2006 and March 
17, 2006.  (R. 4276-4436).  Likewise, Douglas Knight admitted that the 
Tomlinsons offered to purchase the Premises on March 17, 2006.  (Id.) 
Accordingly, Douglas Knight is mistaken in arguing that material facts 
remain in dispute.  All of the facts entitling Picture Perfect to judgment as a matter 
of law are undisputed and the district court’s ruling should not be disturbed.   
c. Whether a hypothetical owner would violate the applicable 
building code by using or occupying a real property improvement 
without a certificate of occupancy is a red herring issue.   
 
On appeal, Douglas Knight argues that this Court should find as a matter of 
law that the “date of first use or possession” of a single-family dwelling can never 
precede the date upon which the local agency issues a certificate of occupancy.  
See Brief of Douglas Knight at pp. 27-32.  According to Douglas Knight, because 
the statewide building code (adopted by administrative regulation pursuant to 
statutory authority) prohibits “use” or “occupancy” of an improvement at any time 
before a certificate of occupancy is issued, as a matter of law an improvement 
cannot be first “used” or “possessed” for purposes of applying the statute of repose 
in Section 78B-2-225(3)(a) until a certificate of occupancy is issued.   Id. at p. 28. 
Douglas Knight’s argument is untenable and should be rejected.  The main 
problem with Douglas Knight’s argument is that the express language of 
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Section 78B-2-225 contemplates that use or possession may occur before the 
issuance of a certificate of occupancy.  The statute says that substantial completion 
occurs at “the earliest of” three potential occurrences: a certificate of substantial 
completion, a certificate of occupancy, or actual use or possession.  Section 78B-2-
225(1)(c) (emphasis added).  By including the language “earliest of,” the 
Legislature expressly recognized that a property can be used or possessed before 
the issuance of a certificate of occupancy.   
Further, whether or not a hypothetical owner who occupies a hypothetical 
property without a certificate of occupancy is in violation of the building code is 
immaterial in this case, rendering this issue a red herring.  Here, there is no 
contention or evidence that the building code required Outpost to obtain a 
certificate of occupancy as a prerequisite to taking possession of the Premises and 
putting it to use by staging it for sale, especially where the Premises had already 
passed final inspection.4  Outpost was using or possessing the Premises and 
construction was complete, but no certificate of occupancy was required insomuch 
as no one was actually living in the home, no one stored their own personal 
belongings there, no one slept there overnight, etc.  Thus, Douglas Knight’s 
                                                          
4 The fact that the Premises had passed final inspection is significant, as not all real 
property improvements result in a certificate of occupancy. Typically, certificates 
of occupancy must be requested from the governing city or county and, if not 
requested, they are not always issued automatically. Often, final inspection is the 
operative date for the building department in terms of completion. 
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argument that a hypothetical owner would violate the building code by using or 
possessing a premises without a certificate of occupancy is simply misplaced.   
Further, Utah contractors (“providers” as used in 78B-2-225) would suffer 
significant prejudice if the Court were to adopt the statutory interpretation urged by 
Douglas Knight.  Not all construction projects or improvements are finished, and 
some projects are delayed for extended periods.  If the statute of repose were not 
triggered until the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, contractors that perform 
work on projects that are never completed or which are delayed for a lengthy 
period of time could be exposed to never-ending liability.  This would be directly 
contrary to the stated purpose of Section 78B-2-225(3)(a): lessening the “costs and 
hardships” suffered by contractors as a result of lawsuits filed in relation to long-
passed construction projects that are exceedingly remote in time.5   
                                                          
5 Section 78B-2-225(2) provides: 
 
The Legislature finds that:  
 
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or 
breach of duty after the possibility of injury or damage has become highly 
remote and unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to the provider and the 
citizens of the state; 
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records 
storage costs, undue and unlimited liability risks during the life of both a 
provider and an improvement, and difficulties in defending against claims 
many years after completion of an improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and 
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The same practical problems relating to the commencement of the statute of 
repose would arise from owners of improvements who fail or refuse to abide by 
building code requirements and continue using and possessing their property 
anyway.  If Douglas Knight’s interpretation were correct, those owners could 
effectively toll commencement of the statute of repose by wrongfully using and 
occupying their property without obtaining a certificate of occupancy.   
But the statute of repose in Section 78B-2-225(3)(a) does not require 
“lawful” use or possession as a prerequisite to commencement of the six-year 
period; rather, any use or possession will suffice.  For various reasons, people do 
things that are unlawful, but an owner’s unlawful possession should not be held to 
cause detriment to a contractor on the project by effectively tolling the application 
of the statute of repose during the period of the owner’s unlawful possession.   
Douglas Knight cites a North Carolina Court of Appeals case, Nolan v. 
Paramount Homes, Inc., 135 N.C.App. 73, 76, 518 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1999), for the 
proposition that the issuance of a certificate of occupancy is the triggering date for 
the countdown of the statute of repose.  That case is distinguishable from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
unexpected seven years following completion or abandonment; and 
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the 
citizens of the state to impose the periods of limitation and repose provided 
in this chapter upon all causes of action by or against a provider arising out 
of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an improvement. 
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present case because it involved application and construction of a North Carolina 
statute with different language than Utah’s statute.   
In Nolan, the North Carolina statute of repose was triggered by “the later of 
the specific last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action 
or substantial completion of the improvement.”  Nolan at 791 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 
1-50(a)(5)(a)).  “Substantial completion of the improvement” was defined as “‘that 
degree of completion of a project, improvement or specified area or portion thereof 
upon attainment of which the owner can use the same for the purpose for which it 
was intended.’”  Id. (quoting N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(5)(c)).   
The claimant argued that even though a certificate of occupancy was issued 
in June of 1991, the property was not substantially completed until approximately 
seven months later in “March-April 1992” when the defendant completed certain 
outstanding work on a punch-list.  The court disagreed and found that the 
certificate of occupancy date was controlling.  Id. at 791.   
Notably, however, in Nolan there was no evidence or argument presented 
that the plaintiff or its predecessor owner had actually used or possessed the 
property before the certificate of occupancy was issued.  More importantly, North 
Carolina law as applied in Nolan contains elements and requirements not set forth 
in Utah law, including most significantly a very different definition of “substantial 
completion” that requires evidence of intended use and the ability of the property 
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to be put to such intended use.  Utah law incorporates no similar requirements 
regarding a finding of intended use of the property, thus distinguishing Nolan from 
this case entirely.  
Here, it is undisputed that construction of the Premises was complete no 
later than March 17, 2006, because Outpost had used or possessed the Premises 
before that date.  The district court’s summary judgment ruling should therefore be 
affirmed.   
d. Douglas Knight did not preserve its argument that its “indemnity 
and contribution” claim is not subject to the six-year statute of 
repose in Section 78B-2-225(3)(a). 
 
In its “indemnity and contribution” claim against Picture Perfect, Douglas 
Knight alleged that if it was “found liable to the Tomlinsons for any of the Home 
Defect claims asserted by them in the Third Amended Complaint, …then 
[Douglas] Knight [] is entitled to contribution and/or indemnification from Third-
Party Defendants in amounts proportionate to their respective fault and/or 
responsibility.”  R. 891, ¶ 41.  Douglas Knight expressly alleged that its 
“indemnity and contribution claim” was predicated upon Picture Perfect’s and the 
other subcontractors’ alleged “breaches of contract and/or breaches of 
warranty.” R. 890, ¶ 39. 
Douglas Knight argues for the first time on appeal that its cause of action 
styled “indemnity and contribution” is not subject to the six-year statute of repose 
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in Section 78B-2-225(3)(a).  Tellingly, Douglas Knight admits that it did not make 
this argument below but it says the Court should nonetheless entertain it pursuant 
to the plain error doctrine.  Douglas Knight is mistaken.   
The plain error doctrine does not apply here because Douglas Knight cannot 
demonstrate that any alleged “error” was “obvious” to the district court.  See Pratt 
v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 16, 164 P.3d 366 (To establish plain error, appellant must 
show that “the error should have been obvious to the trial court.”).   There was no 
“error” to speak of because the district court’s ruling was correct.   
Douglas Knight’s “indemnity and contribution” claim must be construed to 
arise from contract (and thus be subject to the six-year statute of repose), because 
a) Douglas Knight pleaded its claim under a contract and warranty theory, and b) 
Utah law has abolished the common law causes of action of indemnity and 
contribution.  See Nat. Serv. Indus. v. BW Norton Mf’g. Co., 937 P.2d 551, 554 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing that Utah Liability Reform Act precluded 
common law actions for indemnity and contribution among joint 
tortfeasors); Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App 203, ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 301 
(same).   
In other words, Utah law does not recognize the common law causes of 
action of implied indemnity or contribution as a mechanism for shifting 
responsibility for alleged tortious conduct.  See id.  Therefore, a claimant seeking 
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to avoid liability by shifting blame to someone else must rely upon the comparative 
fault statute or some independent statutory or contractual grounds for relief.6  See 
id.  Because the law precluded Douglas Knight from suing Picture Perfect for 
common law indemnity and contribution, that claim ipso facto must be construed 
to arise from contract.  Thus, the district court property treated the “indemnity and 
contribution” claim as a contract-based claim subject to the six-year statute of 
repose.  There was no “error,” and nothing would have been “obvious” to the 
district court.   
Simply put, the plain error doctrine does not apply in this case.  Douglas 
Knight admits that it failed to preserve its argument on this point and based upon 
that admission, the Court should refuse to entertain the argument. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellee Picture Perfect respectfully 
requests that the Court affirm the district court’s judgment. 
  
 
 
                                                          
6 Indeed, Douglas Knight utilized this procedure by filing third-party contract and 
warranty claims against Picture Perfect (R. 879-920) and concurrently asserting in 
its answer to the Tomlinsons’ third-party complaint that its own alleged fault 
should be reduced by the fault attributable to Picture Perfect, the Tomlinsons, and 
others.  See R. 959 (Douglas Knight’s answer to Tomlinsons’ third-party 
complaint; twelfth affirmative defense).   
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